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The Distribution of Economic Rents
Arising from Subsidized Water When
Land Is Leased
Ray G. Huffaker and B. Delworth Gardner
A broad distribution of the benefits of federally "underpriced" water may be best

promoted by limiting the size of owned acreage and not the sum of owned and leased
acreage as required by the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. Calculated differences
between contractual lease payments and associated tenant-expected economic rents
were statistically tested to determine if landowners fully capture the latter. Cash lease
markets transferred nearly all economic rents anticipated by tenants to landowners in
the study area. Share lease markets do the same if share tenants are assumed to be
moderately risk averse.
Key words: distribution, economic rents, farmland, lease , reclamation.

Since the federal government began subsidizing the use of irrigation water in its reclamation projects, the distribution of the subsidy
has been of paramount concern. The 160-acre
ownership limitation was adopted to spread
broadly the wealth gains resulting from pricing
water below its value in use . Previous investigations of reclamation policy published in this
journal have focused on the magnitude of the
water subsidy and its distribution under strict
versus lenient enforcement of the 160-acre
ownership limitation (Seckler and Young, LeVeen and Goldman).
Until recently, however, a limitation on
leased acreage was not considered necessary
to spread the net income gains resulting from
subsidized water. Apparently landowners
were assumed to capture the bulk of these
gains, which were distributed among them
by the 160-acre ownership limitation. Farmers who found it profitable to operate larger
acreages could lease farmland. Any abovenormal profits earned by tenants were assumed to be transferred to landowners via
competitive bidding for leased farmland. (This
is discussed more extensively below.)

Ray G. Huffaker received his Ph.D. in agricultural economics,
University of California, Davis, in 1983; he is a third-year law
student at Davis . B. Delworth Gardner is a professor of agricultural economics, University of California, Davis.
Review was coordinated by Peter Berck, associate editor.

Proponents of an acreage restriction on
leasing, however, including some officials of
the Bureau of Reclamation, apparently are no
longer willing to assume that landowners capture the rented profits. They argue that unrestricted leasing has concentrated project net
benefits in the hands of a relatively few large
tenants in some reclamation areas (Bureau of
Reclamation, pp. 3-14). Their call for leasing
restrictions was heeded by federal legislators
in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 (RRA).
The acreage limitation was increased to 960
acres for "qualified" recipients, but it included for the first time the sum of leased and
owned acreage receiving subsidized water.
This paper asks whether leasing restrictions, in a reclamation area with an active
farmland leasing market, would produce a
more widespread distribution of project
benefits than that existing under ownership restrictions only. The answer pivots on the
portion of net project benefits captured by
tenants. If tenants are found to secure
a "significant" portion, leasing restrictions
could limit the acquisition of tenant wealth
from subsidized water. If, on the other hand,
landowners capture the bulk of the benefits
through the lease market, leasing restrictions
should be largely innocuous in changing the
distribution of those benefits.
Innocuous leasing restrictions could cause
efficiency losses without producing the equity
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gains which lawmakers anticipated in justifying the new law . A number of existing operations, in reclamation areas containing large
farms and active lease markets, may now be in
violation of the new restrictions and must
therefore adjust accordingly. These adjustments may have adverse impacts on economic
efficiency, depending critically on the strength
of economies of scale. This paper is an effort
to determine the extent of equity gains in a
sample reclamation area containing large
farms and substantial leasing of land receiving
subsidized water. An empirical study is necessary because the distribution of project net
benefits in leasing cannot be determined a
priori as always being captured by landowners. The next section discusses why landowners may not capture total net benefits in realworld lease markets.

Theoretical Model

Equation (1) depicts the distribution of project
net benefits between the landowner and the
tenant associated with lease i:
(l)

d;,

= CP;o[T;o, L;o, MS] - T;,

~

0

where lease i is observed in year t of its duration (leases are generally observed midcourse
rather than during negotiation), and t = 0 represents the time period before lease i starts in
which prospective tenants bid for the lease
and the landowner agrees on a contractual
payment (CP). In equation (I) d; 1 is the difference between the contractual payment and the
tenant's expected economic rents revised by
price and production information gained while
leasing up to year t (T;1). Contractual payment
depends on the economic rents that the tenant
and the landowner each anticipated at t = 0
(T; 0 and L; 0 , respectively) and the structure of
the lease market (MS).
What does rational tenant behavior imply
about the sign of d;,? Assume first that during
negotiation the tenant perfectly projects economic rents over the term of the lease, i.e.,
T;1 = T; 0 • The tenant is assumed to be willing
to bid the contractual price up to the level of
his total expected economic rents since the
latter is the maximum bid he can make and
still earn the opportunity cost rate of return.
Thus, rational tenant behavior indicates that
d;, ::s: 0. Values equal to zero indicate that market competition among tenants has forced the

successful tenant to bid full expected economic rents. Values less than zero indicate
that the tenant captures some of his expected
economic rents due to market structure that is
less favorable to landowners.
The theoretical conditions under which the
landowner could be expected to capture total
net benefits from lease i (d;, = 0) are (a) tenants who are all equally productive (thus supramarginal economic rents are not available
to be captured by any tenant) , (b) a high degree of competition among tenants (thus total
net benefits are fully incorporated into the
agreed contractual rate as prospective tenants
bid against each other for the lease), and (c) a
lack of competition among landowners to find
efficient tenants (thus landowners do not compete against each other by accepting bids that
do not include total net benefits).
The strong possibility that the above conditions may not hold in many farmland lease
markets illustrates the need for an empirical
study. (In fact, it must be widely believed that
they do not hold since recent changes in reclamation law have restricted leased acreage in
an effort to prevent tenants from capturing
"too much" of the available economic rents.)
The spatial dimensions of agricultural production and the resulting high costs of cultivating
widely scattered parcels certainly would violate the condition that all tenants are capable
of producing at equal cost and may dampen
competition among prospective tenants. At
the same time, landowners may vigorously
compete for efficient tenants who are favorably located relative to available leased land.
In either case, the result is that lease prices
may not be bid up to the level of total expected
rents of the most efficient tenants. Thus, a recent crop-sharing study, after recognizing that
competitive formulations ignore the above
problems, analyzed leasing as a bargaining
problem by employing a Nash solution to derive an equilibrium crop share (Bell and Zusman).
Assume now that the tenant imperfectly
projects economic rents associated with lease
i. Thus, there is a discrepancy between the
tenant's expected economic rents at negotiation and his expectation t years into the lease
(T;, =;6 T; 0 ). His revised expectation may fall on
either side of the initial expectation depending
on the information he gains in operating the
lease up to year t of its term. Two implications
of the foregoing are: (a) equation (1) cannot be
used to differentiate empirically between ten-
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ant capture of economic rents due to expectation errors and from rents captured by tenants
due to market imperfections at negotiation;
and (b) tenant rationality is not limited to behavior constrained by d;, :5 0, since d;, > 0 can
occur with expectational errors (hence, the
use of a two-tailed hypothesis test below). The
tenant is "locked into" a contractual rate
which he must pay whether or not his expectations formed at t = 0 are realized at time t.
The distribution of net benefits may therefore
show the tenant paying more than 100% of his
economic rents expected at t = 0. This situation will generally occur when profit expectations are not realized.
Empirical Analysis

The null hypothesis to be tested is that observed contractual lease rates are equal, on
average, to tenant expectations of economic
rents computed from survey information.
Thus, the two-tailed test is:
H0 :

d;, =

HA: a11

=1=

0

o.

It is assumed that the d;,'s are normally distributed so that a t-statistic may be used to
calculate acceptance intervals around d;,. The
sample, to be described more fully below (156
cash and 46 share leases), is large enough so
that the sampling distribution of d;, should
tend toward a normal distribution by the central limit theorem. The large samples of cash
and share leases also permit the approximation of the t-distribution with the standard normal. Assuming the necessary independence of
the dit' s seems reasonable since each was associated with separate fields. Assuming that
the d;,'s were drawn from identical distributions also appears reasonable. The data were
taken from a single region and were therefore
similarly affected by weather, pests, and other
exogenous events. Also, no discernible pattern was found between economies of scale
and the level of tenant-expected economic
rents (discussed below). Varying farm sizes
should therefore not lead to cjissimilar distributions.
The acceptance region for the mean difference is
(2)

- Zatz s/Vn

< d;, <

Zwz

s/Vn

where z = d;,l(s/Vn) is a standard normal deviate, s is the sample standard deviation, and n

is the number of observations in the sample.
The data can also be interpreted in view of the
percentage of tenant-expected rents captured
by landowners. The acceptance region around
the mean percentage of landowner-captured
expected economic rents, PCT;,, is

+ T;,]IT;, < PCT;,
< [Zatz s/Vn) + T;,]IT;,
where PCT;, = CP!Tu * 100 = (dit + T;,) * 100,

(3)

[( - Zatz s/Vn)

by equation (1). The critical values of PCTu in
equation (3) are obtained by substituting the
critical values for d;, from equation (2) into the
above PCT;, function. The results are analyzed
in terms of both acceptance intervals (2)
and (3).
Accept~mce of the null hypothesis implies
that landowners would capture, on average,
full net project benefits if distribution were to
occur when observed at time t. The upper tail
alternative represents average landowner capture of more than 100% of tenant-expected
economic rents, most likely due to unrealized
tenant profit expectations. The lower tail alter
native represents average tenant capture of ;
portion of their expected economic rents fron
leasing.
A very low probability, a = 0.005, ofincor
rectly rejecting H is desired. Such a mistak,
would support the innocuous imposition of re
strictions on leased acreage, with its possible
negative effect on agricultural efficiency.
0

Calculating Tenants' Expected
Economic Rents

Recall that dit is the difference between the
contractual payment and the tenant's expected economic rents, T;,. Actual contractual
payments were observed for each lease as revealed by surveyed tenants in the Imperial
Valley of California. The following addresses
how the T;/s were estimated from survey information taken from 25 tenants participating
in 156 cash and 45 share leases.
Literature exists which shows that farmers
may not be indifferent to the variability of annual returns produced by various crop options
(Just; Lin, Dean, and Moore; Adams). For
this reason, the estimation of tenant-expected
economic rents associated with lease i was
framed in an expected utility-maximization
model where expected utility is an increasing
function of expected wealth, µw;, and a decreasing function of the variance of wealth,
Vw;:
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(4)

= µw; -

E[U(W;)]

cp/2Vw;

n

W; =

L 1Tr[i/(1 +
t=

r)]r

1

where wealth, W;, is defined as the present
value of the flow of annual expected economic
rents, 1T;1, over the life oflease i (t = 1, ... , n
years); <I> is the constant risk aversion coefficient associated with the tenant; and r is
the opportunity rate of return. The proxy used
in the study for r is the rate of newly issued
AAA long-term corporate bonds. This rate is
assumed to be a good average of the productivity of low-risk investments in the capital
markets.
Mean wealth, µw;, was calculated as the
present value of the flow of mean annual expected economic rents:
n

(5)

µw; =

L

[µp;1µy;1

+ Cov(Pit, Yit)

t=I

-

C(Yit)] [1/(1

+

r)]1

where E(Pit) = µp;r is the mean crop price
which the tenant expects for the crop grown in
year t; E(Yit) = µv;r is the corresponding mean
yield expectation; and C(Yit) is the per acre
cost (costs are assumed known with certainty
from the onset of the lease). Expectation is
taken over crop yields and crop prices because when the tenant estimates his expected
rents from the lease the only information he is
assumed to use is his knowledge of yield and
price distributions and of costs.
An elicitation procedure was utilized to calculate the tenant's expectations of crop prices
and yields over the course of the lease. Producers were asked to allocate probabilities,
summing to one, over a range of possible
yields for a given crop. The same process was
repeated for the associated ranges of crop
prices. The first two moments were calculated
from each distribution and used to estimate
the expected rents and variances in equations
(4) and (5), respectively.
Costs, specific to each crop grown by a tenant, were estimated using the format of Imperial County budgets prepared with the Budget
Generator developed by the University of
California Cooperative Extension. Land was
treated as the residual claimant to all economic rents. Slight economies of scale were
built into the budgets. Opportunity costs of
management were arbitrarily fixed at 5% of

gross revenues. Total labor hours were priced
at the going wage rate. Figures entering the
budgets came from survey information on machinery, crop production practices, office
staffs and field labor, variable input usage
(i.e., fertilizer or water applied during each
application specified in a tenant's production
practices), machinery value, and costs of variable inpms (i.e., fertilizer or water cost per
unit). These production data were combined
with information collected from secondary
sources to make crop production costs as
specific as possible to the farm on which the
crop was grown. Estimated costs were then
shown to each operator for confirmation.
Final cost figures resulted from operators' corrections.
Alfalfa was the only crop for which a
covariance between price and yield was estimated and used to compute expected rents.
This is in response to alfalfa producers' ability
to exert greater control of crop yield over the
course of the growing season than do producers of most other crops.
The variance of wealth, V wi, was calculated
as the discounted sum of the variances of annual expected economic rents, V1Tir:
n

(6)

Vwi =

L v1Tit[l/(1 + r)]1.

t=I

This computation assumes that Cov(1T it,
= 0, for all tenants, i.e., rents in different years are uncorrelated. Survey data do not
exist to calculate covariances between years,
nor are there a priori reasons for expecting a
given magnitude. V1Tit were calculated as the
variance of the product of two random variables: Pit, Y; 1 (Mood, Graybill, and Boes, p.

1T;r- z)

180).

A basic weakness of the expected utility approach, pointed out by Freund, is that the constant risk aversion coefficient (<!>) is a subjective variable and is therefore very difficult to
estimate. Chosen values are hard to defend.
Coefficients unique to each operator in this
study were not estimable from survey information. No studies were located which estimated risk aversion coefficients for operators
in the Imperial Valley.
Our approach was first to study the polar
case of tenant risk neutrality. Risk neutrality
serves as a useful benchmark because maximum bids are calculated at their highest level.
If the differences between contractual payments and maximum bids are insignificantly
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different from zero under risk neutrality, they
will only become more so as risk aversion is
allowed to increase. Risk neutrality may not
be an unrealistic assumption. In commenting
on an earlier study calculating maximum bid
prices for farmland (Harris and Nehring),
Whitmore showed that there was little difference between expected and risk-adjusted bid
prices.
A tenant's expected rents were amortized to
make them comparable to the annual payments made in cash and share leases. The
series of uneven annual expected rents can be
converted into an n-year annuity in the following way:
(7)

T;1

=

R(µ wi -

/{t

where R = 1

q,/2 V wi)

[1/(1 +

r)]1}.

Contractual Payments in Cash and
Share Leases

The contractual payment in cash leases is the
lease price, PL ($/acre/year). Differences in
cash leases are thus computed as d; 1 = Pu T;,. In share leases the contractual payment
depends on the predetermined percentage of
yearly gross revenue, a. Because there is no
predetermined lease price, there is uncertainty
as to how much the landowner will be paid
each year of the lease. Payments made in
share leases are put on an expected cashequivalent basis with payments made in cash
leases by redefining mean wealth in equation
(3) to be the present value of the flow of annual
expected gross revenues and calculating the
landowner's amortized share, LSH;,. Differences in share leases are therefore calculated
as d;, = LSH;1 - Tit.
Data

Most of the data used in this study were obtained from a 1982 survey-conducted under
the direction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the University of Californiataken from forty farm operators in the Imperial Valley, California. The sole source of
irrigation water for the valley is the AllAmerican Canal, a federal reclamation project
approved in 1928.
Historically, the valley has been excluded
from the acreage restriction policy, except for
most of the period 1976-80. Since 1980, it has

been again excluded and likely will continue to
be in the future. An area subject to the limitation would have been preferred. However,
farm operators in reclamation areas under current acreage limitations are understandably reluctant to divulge information on leasing practices and prices which might later be used to
tighten up the restrictions even more. Attempts were made to secure data in such areas
with large farms and substantial leasing, without success. The Imperial Valley was selected
because it is in no danger of being affected by
any new reclamation legislation, it has an active lease market, and it receives federally
subsidized water. Farms there are also very
large by almost any standard.
Approximately 460,000 acres are irrigated
with subsidized water. Vegetable crops are
farmed on approximately 90,000 acres with
most of the remainder in field crops. The valley produced a gross income of $764,862,000
in 1981. Vegetable crops accounted for 20% of
the income, with lettuce and melons as the
leading crops. Field crops made up 44%, with
cotton, alfalfa, wheat, and sugarbeets as the
leading income producers. The livestock and
dairy industries provided most of the remaining income.
Sampled farm size ranged from 291 to 7,119
acres. Twenty-five operators surveyed leased
some amount of land. The smaller acreage operations tended to be family farms, while the
larger ones were mainly family corporate
farms.
Operators were asked to describe all of their
leases in terms of rental rate, time horizon,
landowner, crops grown, and capital investment on the rented land. Leases were selected
with terms of five years or less since reliable
information on leases was available only for
the last five years. The identities of the crops
grown on each leased field in 1982 and 1983
were available in the survey. Crops grown
back in 1978 were identified via pesticide application permits on file at the Agricultural
Commissioner's Office in Imperial County.
No records exist to identify the crops produced on the leased fields prior to 1978. None
of the leases studied lasts beyond 1983.
Operators farming more than 1,500 acres
were more diversified than those farming less.
The larger farms produced lettuce, broccoli,
cantaloupes, onions, sudan grass, and tomatoes, in addition to alfalfa, wheat, cotton,
and sugarbeets. The cropping patterns on
owned land in the survey are much like those
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Table 2. Acceptance Intervals: Share Leases,
Tenant Risk Aversion

on farmland under cash leases. The major difference between the crops grown in cash
leases and those grown in share leases is that
only one of the forty-five share leases .studied
included any crops from the second group
mentioned (vegetables, melons, etc.), while
28% of the cash leases included such crops.
This reflects the strong possibility that landowners in the sample are averse to sharing in
the risk associated with vegetable crops because of large income fluctuations from one
year to another.

Upper

Lower

PCT,;

Upper

-23.87

-9.62

23 .87

82

92

118

p = 4>/2\/(W)

(8)

Acceptance intervals were first estimated for
cash and share leases assuming risk-neutral
tenants. The average difference between pairs
of cash lease prices and tenant expected economic rents was estimated to be -$18.33/acre
(results are reported in table I). The $18.33/
acre captured by tenants falls squarely within
the interval denoting acceptance of the null
hypothesis [ ± $29.79/acre]. Likewise, the 92%
of total rents captured by cash landowners
was not significantly different from 100% since
the acceptance interval was estimated to be
83%, 117%.
The share lease sample does not strongly
support either the null or alternative hypothesis. Share lease tenants were estimated
to capture an average of $22.77 per acre, or
16% of total expected rents. The amount of
tenant captured rents falls on the borderline of
the acceptance interval estimated around ail,
[±$22.83). The 84% captured by share landowners on average also falls on the borderline
of the PCT acceptance interval, 84%, 116%.
Risk Aversion in Share Leases

Acceptance intervals were reestimated for
share leases, assuming a risk premium of $50
per acre, to see if the difference between share
rates and expected economic rents would become decidedly insignificant. The risk pre-

(Newbery and Stiglitz, pp. 72-73), where
V(W) = $56,263 is the average discounted
variance of wealth over all tenants. The assumed average risk premium of $50 per acre,
being less than IO% of the average expected
wealth over all share tenants ($522.28/acre),
does not appear unrealistic.
The null hypothesis of no significant difference between cash-equivalent share rates and
tenant expected economic rents is accepted
(results reported in table 2). Share tenants
capture an average of $9.62 per acre (8% of
total rents), which falls within the associated
acceptance interval [ ± $23. 87). The 92% of total rents captured on average by share landowners is not significantly different from 100%
given the acceptance interval (82%, 118%).
Other Findings

It does not appear that a significantly larger
fraction of economic rents is being captured
by the larger tenants than by smaller ones.
There was no discernible pattern in the percentage of total expected rents paid to tenants
and scales of operation. This indicates that if
size generates greater economic rents, both
landowners and tenants realize it; and the
competition among large tenants is severe
enough to transfer the same fraction of these
rents to the landowners, as is the case with
smaller scales of operation.

Acceptance Intervals: Cash and Share Leases, Tenant Risk Neutrality
H0 :

Cash
Share

il,;

mium is the amount of wealth a tenant would
be willing to give up in order to "buy his way
out" of crop price and production risk. The
average risk premium over all tenants is

Discussion of Results

Table 1.

Lower

ila "'

H 0 : PCT,; "' 100%

$0

Lower

il,;

Upper

Lower

PCT,;

Upper

-29.79
-22 .83

-18 .33
-22 .77

29.79
22 .83

83
84

92

117
116

84
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Reclamation policy has been criticized for
allowing operators to frustrate the intent of the
acreage restrictions by selling their land to relatives or employees and then leasing it back at
very favorable rates in what are known as
"sweetheart" deals . The Imperial Valley has
been exempt from acreage restrictions for
much of its history, and no evidence is available that farmers expect that the policy will be
changed. Therefore, valley operators probably would not have the same incentives to
form "sweetheart" deals in the attempt to
overcome acreage restrictions as may those
living under restrictions. This study, therefore, does not provide a test of this issue.
Finally, see Huffaker and Gardner for discussion on how our results shed light on the
controversy surrounding current attempts to
repeal the RRA's controversial "hammer"
clause [43 USCS sec. 390cc(b)].
Conclusions

Based on our empirical findings from the study
area, the major policy conclusion is that a
broad distribution of the benefits of "underpriced" water is best promoted by limiting the
size of owned acreage and not the size of the
sum of owned and leased acreage as required
by the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. Our
results show that cash lease markets would
transfer nearly all economic rents anticipated
by tenants to the landowners in the study area.
The same results would hold in share lease
markets if the share tenants were assumed to
be moderately risk averse.
The Imperial Valley is not an ideal study
area in all respects, however, since it has not
been continuously subject to the acreage restrictions of reclamation law. Thus, from our
data we can infer little about the circumvention of the intent of the law by "sweetheart"
arrangements between operators and family
members and employees. We believe we have
shown, however, that this area with underpriced water, extensive leasing, and a broad
size distribution of tenants, has developed
competitive lease markets capable of transferring the bulk of project net benefits to landowners; and this result might well be applicable to other reclamation areas. A possible
caveat is that landowners in the Imperial Val-

ley are under no pressure to dispose of excess
land, but the effects of this on the lease market
are far from obvious.
[Received February 1984; final revision
received February 1985.]
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